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Abstract: Despite the fact that economic concerns are the main driver of the EU 
integration process, integration does carry a substantial social dimension. Yet, 
it remains an open question whether this social dimension ‘only’ supports the 
market or whether goals such as social justice, solidarity and employment con-
ditions are independent of or even work against goals of market efficiency. To 
address this question the paper presents an original dataset on all 346 binding 
EU social policy acts adopted since the Union’s founding. In a descriptive ap-
proach, I contrast instruments and dynamics in areas and subfields connected 
more closely to the common market with those more directly constituting a 
social dimension in its own right. On this basis, I argue that the shape of EU 
social policy has substantially changed, strengthening its market-supporting 
dimension while weakening policy focused on its social dimension. The paper 
opens up for discussion possible political dynamics driving these patterns. 
Keywords: EU social policy, regulation, labour law, freedom of movement, party 
politics 
1 Introduction1 
With the European Union (EU) in crisis, the social dimension of Europe is often 
referred to as a solution to some of the Union’s most pressing problems. The 
Pillar of Social Rights proposed in 2017 by the Commission to render the Euro-
zone more resilient, or Juncker advocating a Youth Guarantee to address hard-
ship resulting from the financial and economic crisis are two prominent exam-
|| 
1 I presented earlier versions of this paper at the 2015 Network Meeting EU Economic and 
Social Integration in Leipzig and at the 2016 ECPR Regulatory Governance Conference Tilburg. I 
wish to thank the participants, the anonymous reviewers and Wolfgang Günther for helpful 
comments as well as Monika Rohmer and Charly Uster for research assistance. 
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ples. At the same time EU social policy is often contested for doing too much 
(red tape as Brexit advocates argued), for not doing the right thing (conservative 
voices, e.g. when considering liberal anti-discrimination policies), for only sup-
porting market integration or for simply not doing enough to tackle existing 
problems (Lynggaard 2016). The potential of social Europe to respond to and 
fund these hopes and criticisms is inherently tied to the question whether EU 
regulatory social policy (still) supports the market or provides for social goals in 
their own right. 
In the early and mid-1990s researchers asked whether EU social policy is 
best characterized as market-supporting, i.e. seeking market efficiency, or 
whether a substantial EU social dimension existed in its own right 
(Leibfried/Pierson 1995; Ross 1994; Streeck 1995). From this latter perspective 
social justice, solidarity and favorable employment conditions are goals a mar-
ket cannot achieve, however efficient. Social policy in its own right can be justi-
fied for reaching these goals (Prosser 2006). This divide continues to play an 
important (implicit or explicit) role in research on EU integration and social 
policy. It informs recent assessments of the relationship between economic and 
social goals in the European Semester (Copeland/Daly 2018; 
Crespy/Vanheuverzwijn 2017; Maricut/Puetter 2018), studies of EU employment 
policy (Mailand/Arnholtz 2015) or the social investment approach (De la Porte/ 
Natali 2018). I share with these works an interest in the underlying nature of EU 
social policy. However, going beyond existing studies on specific policies I pro-
vide here a systematic analysis of EU regulatory social policy. 
Why study regulatory policy? The notion of Social Europe or EU social poli-
cy is widely used, but no clear-cut definition exists. Frequently national social 
policy is an (implicit) reference point. Yet, national and EU social policy differ in 
their instrument mix and the issues each address. Typically, at the national 
level social policy is associated with the welfare state, which distributes money 
to those at risks of unemployment, old age, health or sickness. The EU budget is 
limited to only a fraction of national budgets and far-reaching direct financial 
transfers are not an option (Schmid 2018: 177). This renders distribution com-
paratively less relevant at EU level. Throughout the integration process nation 
states have been reluctant to transfer powers on welfare state issues to the EU 
and only in the early 2000s did member states agree to coordinate policies on 
issues such as employment (Heidenreich/Zeitlin 2009), pensions 
(Guidi/Guardiancich 2018) and poverty (Copeland/Daly 2012) – hoping to learn 
from each other’s successes and failures via the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMCs). However, coordination does not seem well suited to assess the nature of 
EU social policy. Research demonstrates increasing skepticism on the OMCs 
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capacity to steer policy (Copeland/Haar 2013; Kahn-Nisser 2015; Kröger 2009). 
Moreover, the OMCs have been criticized for their focus on market support 
(Copeland/Daly 2018; Crespy/Vanheuverzwijn 2017; De La Porte/Heins 2015). In 
this light it seems reasonable to focus our analysis on regulation as an empiri-
cally relevant part of EU social policy – not least because the EU has been de-
scribed as “regulatory state” (Majone 1993) – and a more likely case to find so-
cial policy in its own right. Put differently, if we do not find that regulatory 
policy advances social goals in its own right, we have good grounds to question 
the capacity of EU social policy more broadly to respond to and fund the hopes 
and criticism outlined above. 
While for scholars of EU social policy the focus on regulatory instruments is 
not new, systematic quantitative assessments cover the period up to the crisis 
only (Falkner et al. 2004; Haar 2009) or analyses only provide case study evi-
dence (Mailand/Arnholtz 2015). I present an original dataset of all 346 pieces of 
binding regulatory social policy (1958–2017) and an objective aggregate meas-
ure to characterize EU social policy output as either market-supporting or social 
policy in its own right. On this basis I argue that the shape of EU social policy 
has substantially changed, strengthening its market-supporting dimension, 
while social policy in its own right has been weakened. Exploring possible 
causes for the distinct dynamics supporting the market or seeking social goals 
in their own right, I point at the relevance of interest based factors and political 
contestation to be included more systematically in aggregate analysis of EU 
social policy dynamics. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section (2) outlines the theoretical 
argument that instruments related to market-supporting social policy differ 
from instruments seeking social justice, solidarity and employment conditions 
in their own right. I then introduce the dataset covering all social policy acts 
adopted from the founding of the EU until the end of 2017 (3). Section 4 provides 
a big picture analysis of EU regulatory policy over time. Next, section 5 zooms in 
to developments in three subfields particularly relevant to the argument that 
there are two types of social Europe that exist, which differ in their instruments, 
as well as timing, stability and innovation capacity. Finally, potential drivers of 
the patterns and dynamics are discussed (6) before section 7 concludes. 
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2 What for? Regulating to enhance market 
efficiency or seeking other (social) goals 
To guide our thinking about social policy developments in the EU this section 
argues that regulation can be enacted to either enhance market efficiency or to 
seek (social) goals that cannot be reached by markets. To clarify the difference 
between the two types of social policy I briefly retrace a more general line of 
reasoning in regulation theory (cf. Hartlapp/ Rauh 2013), before I return to the 
EU policy debate. 
I start by discussing the goals of regulation. Markets are typically regarded 
as means to produce the optimal allocation of resources in an equilibrium of 
economic supply and demand. Governments provide rules to enhance the allo-
cation function of markets and intervene where markets fail, e.g. where prefer-
ences are time-inconsistent or information asymmetries exist. This is particular-
ly important for goods or services that are in the public interest. We frequently 
find examples for such intervention in the area of social policy, e.g. policies that 
provide incentives to invest into skills in order to improve the employment per-
spective of market participants. From this perspective regulation is “always 
second-best” (Prosser 2006: 366), because it is justified (only) to support market 
mechanisms in the allocation of resources. We can distinguish this view from a 
second perspective on public regulation. Here, the goal of government interven-
tion is not to reach perfect competition in the market. Rather intervention seeks 
to alter the very quality of markets. Regulation is addressing misallocation from 
a moral point of view and is thus seen as “balancing … competing values setting 
out the sort of society we wish to live in” (Prosser 2006: 375). Such reasoning 
exposes a radical divide between two goals of regulation. In the first view, the 
goal of public regulation is to support or increase efficiency of market alloca-
tion. In the second view, the goals are to support or increase social justice or 
solidarity. 
We can broaden this argument to include reasoning about the actors in-
volved. For Majone (1993) non-majoritarian institutions and technocratic actors 
are best at regulating markets efficiently. Policies for social goals in turn require 
political justification since they will render some better off than others. Put 
differently, while market efficiency is best regulated through technocrats reset-
ting the conditions for successful market allocation processes, social goals need 
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to be justified and decided upon by politicians.2 Equipped with this general 
perspective on regulation we now turn to the EU. 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, when greater numbers of social policy acts were 
adopted, a virulent debate on the rational or nature of these acts emerged. 
Streeck (1995) argued that a two tier social policy existed: social policy in its 
own right – or as he framed it, instruments assuring “industrial and social 
rights” (Streeck 1995: 40) – at the national level and social policy at the EU lev-
el,  
suited to market-making by way of negative integration and efficiency enhancing regula-
tion. This is because the removal of barriers to cross-border trade and mobility is less 
threatening to national sovereignty and less demanding on democratic legitimation than 
the creation and enforcement of rights and obligations of citizenship (Streeck 1995: 34).  
Consequently, social policy at the EU level would be produced in a collateral 
manner at best, and would affect primarily areas with a functional link to the 
free movement of workers in the EU common market (Leibfried/Pierson 1995). 
This reflects an understanding of regulation enacted to support the allocation 
function of markets. Social policy that would balance competing demands 
would in turn remain at the national level. Contrasting with Majone (1993) who 
favours a technocratic origin of measures, Streeck (1995) stresses the lack of 
political demand from member states. Others have pinpointed the difference 
between EU policies supporting or enforcing the market on the one hand and 
market correcting or market cushioning policies of a more interventionist nature 
on the other hand (cf. Sbragia/ Stolfi 2008: 133). For these scholars, market-
correcting instruments sought other goals than efficiency. More specifically, the 
emerging corporatist policy community was analysed as a driver of a genuine 
EU social policy (Falkner 1998). This, again, points at political dynamics to ex-
plain social regulation. 
More recently, the question whether EU social policy is supporting the mar-
ket or exists in its own right was revived. The distinct camps draw on fundamen-
tally different arguments. On the one side, authors employ Polanyi’s counter-
movement to argue that the creation of the market will be answered with an 
embedding of the market through social policy. Concisely, “[m]arket-making 
produced market-modification by embedding it in an underlying social logic” 
(Caporaso/Tarrow 2009: 597; similarly Eigmüller 2013). Empirically the authors 
|| 
2 Majone (1993) contrasted regulation (for efficient markets) with distribution (for social goals) 
as different types of instruments. The analytical distinction along the line of goals and actors, 
however, can also be applied to different types of regulation. 
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draw on developments in EU anti-discrimination policy. In a critique Höpner 
and Schäfer (2012, cf. already Streeck 1995: 44) argue that anti-discrimination 
policy is not sufficient evidence. First, the authors claim that the policy area is 
logically conducive to arguments on both sides. Anti-discrimination policy at 
the same time enables optimal allocation processes on the market and accords 
individual social rights that cannot be reached by markets alone. Secondly, they 
argue that EU market integration is undermining national social policy 
(Streeck’s domestic tier) more rapidly than political battles for EU social policy 
in its own right can be won in Brussels (Höpner/ Schäfer 2012). Setting the ar-
gument on thorough theoretical grounds has much merit. Yet, empirical support 
for either side remains sparse. In studying all adopted social policy regulation 
since the founding of the EU, I both provide a more systematic empirical ap-
proach to this problem and add to existing studies. 
3 Empirical approach 
As outlined in the introduction this paper focuses on regulatory social policy. 
The universe of analytically relevant cases are all binding EU social policy acts 
(regulations and directives). I retrieved data from EurLex for the period 1958 
when the first act was adopted at the EU level to the end of 2017. EurLex covers 
all formal acts adopted by the EU institutions. To capture as many social regula-
tion acts as possible, disregarding e.g. portfolio lead, I use two distinct search 
logics. I combine a directory code search3 with a keyword search for ‘Social 
Policy’ and ‘Worker Mobility’. The resulting data is merged, cleaned up and 
double entries deleted. Acts exclusively based on the Euratom treaty are exclud-
ed as well as acts that are geographical extensions or those that specifically 
apply to single Member States without substantial policy advances. This results 
in a total of 346 regulatory EU social policy acts. In the following analysis revi-
sions, codifications and amendments referring to a predecessor act in the title 
are included but displayed separately as modifications (N=200). This allows for 
|| 
3 The codes covered are freedom of movement for workers (05.10), general social provisions 
(05.20.05), European Social Fund (ESF, 05.20.10), working conditions (05.20.20), employment 
and unemployment (05.20.30), social security (05.20.40), approximation of certain social 
provisions (05.20.50), insurance related to the right of establishment and freedom to provide 
services (06.20.20.10), social conditions of transport policy (07.20.40.20), health protection 
(15.30), and European citizenship (20.20). 
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differentiation between acts that improve existing standards and acts that de-
fine new standards, indicating policy innovation. 
To objectively measure market-supporting social regulation versus social 
policy in its own right, we need an indicator applicable at an aggregate level 
and consistent over time. The Treaty base fulfils these criteria. Every directive, 
decision and regulation refers to a specific article in the applicable EU treaty. 
The EU founding treaty considered the coordination of the member states’ so-
cial-security systems to be a precondition for the free circulation of people and 
introduced the principle of equal pay for male and female workers. In the fol-
lowing decades, more and more competences were transferred to the EU, in 
particular the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty broadened 
the areas of EU social policy. In addition, decision-making in the inter-
institutional process was eased by allowing for qualified majority voting in 
many sub-fields of social policy (Falkner 1998: 56–77). Over time the numbering 
of the articles has changed, not least to accommodate for competence expan-
sion, but the treaty base can be easily traced back throughout the history of EU 
integration. This fulfils the criterion of time consistency. 
A second aspect is equally important for my argument. Assessing the sub-
stance of the treaty articles allows linking them to either the market making or 
the social policy in its own right argument. This allows classifying large num-
bers of acts according to their dominant logic without subjectively assessing 
their content. Two caveats remain. First, the treaty base captures the dominant 
logic of an act from a bird’s eyes perspective. While arguably a good measure 
across a large number of acts, it might be misleading in a single instance. The 
agenda setter might choose the treaty base for strategic reasons, e.g. to allow for 
decision-making under qualified majority rather than unanimity. Yet, this is the 
exception rather than the rule. Second, and this is a trickier point, we may as-
sume that the two types of goals are not mutually exclusive. Conceptually a 
market-supporting rational may entail some notion of broader societal well-
being in its own right, too. In fact both perspectives may simply coincide in the 
same policy that aims to “create free but fair markets” (Höpner/Schäfer 2012; 
also Windholz/Hodge 2013). Yet, non-exclusivity should not a priori introduce 
bias as long as acts qualifying as non-exclusive do not cluster in only one of the 
two types. We spot checked our data and find (rare) examples for acts coded as 
“genuine social goals” on the basis of their treaty article that also further the 
market (e.g. anti-discrimination) as well as acts based on market-supporting 
treaty articles that also benefit genuine social goals (e.g. residence rights). Fu-
ture studies should follow up on this point to assess how frequently both goals 
coincide in EU social policy to better understand whether this might be a consti-
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tuting characteristic of EU social policy. For the purpose of this article, however, 
the treaty bases seems to be a meaningful and at the same time sufficiently 
objective measure to operationalize the concepts of interest. 
How to tell the two logics apart when you see them? Part of the treaty arti-
cles connect directly to the market freedoms. This is the case for articles under 
title IV, which support the four freedoms of movement. Chapter 1, in particular, 
focuses on workers and comprises provisions that ensure non-discrimination on 
ground of nationality and administrative practices (Art. 45 and 46), social pro-
tections necessary for worker mobility (Art. 48) as well as provisions assuring 
mobility for self-employed (Art. 53). Under a different title Art. 21 enshrines free 
movement as a fundamental right of every EU citizen. I classify acts that draw 
on these and related treaty articles as market-supporting (MARKET). Title X, in 
turn, is dedicated to social policy. Here, reaching social goals rather than mar-
ket efficiency is the objective. In particular, articles protect workers against 
health or social risks and assure good working conditions (Art. 153), empower 
the weaker part in the relationship of management and labor (Art. 154 and 155) 
or transfer rights for equal pay between women and men (Art. 157) and promote 
cooperation to assure individual protection in social matters (Art. 160). Under 
different titles Art. 19 enshrines non-discrimination as a fundamental right of 
EU citizens and Art. 21–24 grant citizens political rights and protection, while 
Art. 168 seeks public health. Equally, articles that envisage the regulation of 
distributive instruments such as the European Social Fund (Art. 164) and the 
European Structural Funds (Art. 175) seek intervention in market allocation to 
integrate disadvantaged people into society and ensure fairer life opportunities 
for all – thus reaching goals other than market efficiency. Subfields drawing on 
these and related treaty articles are classified as social policy in its own right 
(OWNRIGHT). 
Subject areas (Free Movement of Workers, Social Provisions, Funding, Man-
agement & Organization, Others) are exclusive at the level of treaty articles. At a 
hierarchically lower level, subfields draw on different treaty paragraphs or sub-
paragraphs. In exceptional cases, different subfields might draw on the same 
treaty base (e.g. Art. 21 or Art. 153). In these cases, I assessed subfields individu-
ally by checking the substance of the act.4 Some subfields could not be classi-
fied into either of the logics, e.g. transport (Art. 91 and 94) or the establishment 
|| 
4 Where the treaty article is of very general nature or concerns formal procedures rather than 
substantial characteristics (e.g. Art. 100 on institutional provisions or Art. 235 on decision 
procedure) I classified the subject area by individually checking the substance of the act, too. 
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of committees (Art. 134) or the collection of information and statistics (Art. 337 
and 338). These subfields are marked as not assigned (n.a.). 
The following analysis uses the data in a descriptive manner. Social policy 
patterns are contrasted with general policy developments in the EU as described 
in the cross-sectoral study by Häge (2011; similarly Kassim et al. 2017). 
4 The big picture: EU social policy 1958–2017 
At the inception of the EU, social policy developments were slow to take off. Yet, 
the EU adopted an impressive number of acts since. The social acquis consists of 
346 acts at the end of 2017 (including modifications). In figure 1 self-executing 
regulations show the highest aggregate numbers (total: 238). Typically, these 
regulations lay down general policy principles. Thus, despite being directly 
applicable, their substantial impact is often limited. Directives (total: 108), in 
turn, are generally considered the most important form of legislative policy-
making at EU level. They fix common minimum standards that are binding to 
member states but leave some room for how to reach these goals. 
Turning to instrument types, we see that the number of regulations rose 
slowly but steadily with a sharp rise occurring after 2002. A change in decision-
making accounts for this. Since the adoption of the Nice Treaty, joint EP and 
Council regulations have almost entirely replaced Council acts. Directives show 
distinct dynamics. The Commission proposed virtually no social policy direc-
tives in the early decades. The Council adopted the first directive in 1975 only. 
From then onward numbers grew constantly with more pronounced develop-
ments taking place since the mid-1980s and particularly in the 1990s. The last 
decade is marked by a flattening curve and substantially fewer EU social policy 
directives. This contrasts with a further widening and deepening of social policy 
competences and points to the relevance of institutional and interest based 
explanations, which we will explore in more detail in section 6. 
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Figure 1: Aggregated number of EU Social Policy Acts (1958–2017, by year of adoption). The 
graph depicts aggregate numbers of regulatory social policy acts (dotted black line). Within 
this group, numbers for different instrument types are outlined separately (solid lines): regula-
tions (grey) and directives (black). Modifications are also outlined separately (dotted grey 
line). 
Source: Own compilation based on EurLex, including modifications but excluding geographical 
extension, acts addressing one member state only and acts exclusively based on the Euratom 
treaty 
Comparing social policy with cross-sectoral dynamics in the EU two points are 
noteworthy. First, there is general agreement that legislative activity has slowed 
down with crisis responses and a changing role of the Commission as agenda 
setter. Yet, typically authors date this to occur as of 2009/ 2010 (Kassim et al. 
2017). Social policy seems to differ. For directives decline started already 10 
years earlier – at times of enlargement rather than in a crisis context. Regula-
tions, in contrast, do not show signs of decline, rather their growth rate took up. 
Again, this differs from cross-sectoral developments, where Häge (2011: 466) 
notes a decline since 1992. Second, and somewhat qualifying the first point, 
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out. This is in part natural as a revision process is frequently built into acts 
when first negotiated or external changes demand adaptation. And revision 
becomes necessary to integrate and clarify evolving case law (Martinsen 2015). 
Yet, while particularly in the 1980s and 1990s a majority of social policy acts 
provided new standards, today modifications are the rule. 
Table 1: EU Regulatory social policy acts by area and instrument (1958–2017). Treaty articles 
are classified as market-supporting (MARKT) or own social right (OWNRIGHT), some articles do 
not fall in either category (not assigned – n.a.). 
Subject area Total acts Subfield Regulations Directives Sum 
Free movement of 
workers 
108 Social security systems (MARKT) 81       1 82 
Worker mobility (MARKT) 6       4 10 
Recognition of professional qualifica-
tion (MARKT)
4        3 7 
Right of residence (n.a.) 3       6 9 
Social  
provisions 
86 Health and safety at work (OWNRIGHT) 2       43 45 
Labour law (OWNRIGHT) 0       26 26 
Anti-discrimination (OWNRIGHT) 1       12 13 
Social insurance (OWNRIGHT) 1       1 2 
Funding 45 European Social Fund (ESF) (OWN-
RIGHT)
14        0 14 
Direct distributions (OWNRIGHT) 15       0 15 
Others spending measures (OWNRIGHT) 16       0 16 
Management and 
organization 
84 Agencies and committees (n.a.) 21       0 21 
Data and statistics (n.a.) 63       0 63 
Others 23 European citizenship (OWNRIGHT) 2       1 3 
Health (OWNRIGHT) 1       2 3 
Transport (n.a.) 8       9 17 
Total acts 346 238     108 346 
Source: Own compilation based on EurLex, including modifications but excluding geographical 
extension, acts addressing one member state only and acts exclusively based on the Euratom 
treaty. 
Absolute numbers of acts distribute unequally across subject areas. Table 1 
shows that Free movement of workers is quantitatively most important (108), 
Social provisions (86) and Management and organization (84) follow suit. At a 
more disaggregated level Social security systems stands out as subfield being 
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regulated most frequently (82). In contrast, Health and safety at work (45) as 
well as General labour law (26) show high numbers of acts too. 
We now turn to the two logics of market-supporting versus social policy in 
its own right. Absolute numbers of acts classified as social policy in its own 
right outnumber market-supporting acts. The dominant logics and instrument 
types differ strongly across subject areas. Freedom of movement is supporting 
the market almost exclusively via regulations. Social provisions constitute so-
cial policy in its own right via directives and funding does so via regulations. 
The subject area management and organization is important for increasing 
numbers of regulations adopted in the fields Data and statistics (63), frequently 
regulating data collection in the context of the OMC, as well as Agencies and 
committees (21) that concern staff decisions. Here, regulation does not concern 
substantial policies and therefore does not provide leverage for the distinction 
between market-supporting social policy and social policy in its own right. The 
category Others in turn is a catch-all category that comprises acts that formally 
belong to other areas, but demonstrate a substantial link to social policy.5 
Therefore the following analysis zooms into freedom of movement, social provi-
sions and funding, as these areas are particularly relevant for a better under-
standing of dynamics and exploration of possible causes.6 
5 Comparing dynamics of market-supporting 
policy and social policy in its own right 
5.1 Free Movement of Workers 
The movement of tourists, mobile workers, jobseekers, retirees and other per-
sons in the EU is one of the four freedoms enshrined in the Treaties. Social regu-
lation to support the free circulation of persons already figured in the Founding 
Treaty. Primarily this concerned coordination of Social security systems to ad-
dress insecurity among workers. Figure 2 shows that the first regulation on the 
coordination of social security systems had been adopted in 1958 and has been 
revised frequently (today 883/2004/EC and implementing regulation 368/2014). 
|| 
5 E.g. not all EU transport acts but only those addressing social provisions for transport work-
ers etc. 
6 Data on all policy fields can be found at http://www.polsoz.fu-
berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/de-fr/Team/Hartlapp/index.html. 
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It connects national social security systems on age, unemployment, sickness, 
family benefits, invalidity as well as accidents at work. Rather than establishing 
common substantial standards, these acts seek to regulate the management of 
interfaces between national systems by assuring that entitlements are portable 
across countries. Member states are allowed to stick to their national systems as 
long as individuals are treated equally regardless of nationality. Following a 
similar logic, acts on Worker mobility address obstacles to mobility beyond so-
cial security systems, e.g. general rights to free movement or schooling of work-
ers’ children (77/486/EWG). Recognition of professional qualifications (last revi-
sion 2013/55/EC) in turn support the market by increasing transparency. 
Workers who want to exercise their profession in another country need to com-
municate knowledge and skills to a prospective client or employer. Clients and 
employers are dependent, in turn, on decoding the unknown qualification to 





















Figure 2: Development of regulatory acts on Free movement of workers (1958–2017) 
Source: Own compilation based on EurLex, including modifications but excluding geographical 
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The Right of residence has been an issue since the 1990s. Initially it was related 
to worker mobility (Schmidt 2018: 75). Going beyond an understanding of indi-
viduals as workers or consumers, recent acts establish that there is a non-
economic right to mobility and residence in the EU (Eigmüller 2013: 371). An 
example is the “Right of workers to remain in the territory of a member state 
after having been employed in that state” (regulation No 635/2006). These de-
velopments were pushed by the Court of Justice of the EU in a number of famous 
cases that granted social rights independent of market participation (e.g. Dano 
C-333/13). Member States contest these developments and insisted on safe-
guards for access to national social security derived from the right of residence 
in case of ‘unreasonable’ burdens on national social security (Martinsen/Werner 
2018). Public debates on welfare tourism show the potential for political con-
flict, where EU regulation pushes for social policy goals in their own right 
through the backdoor of market-making (Schmidt 2018: 128). 
In sum, in the area of free movement of workers, we see that regulations 
dominate over directives and that there is a continuous dynamic toward a rather 
steady positive trend. Strikingly, modifications strongly dominate over new 
standards (17 acts only). Mobility of workers and transparency of skills is regu-
lated to render the common market more efficient. Political changes, such as the 
increasing number and heterogeneity of member states, do not seem to show 
systematic effects. Put differently, we can characterize the regulatory dynamic 
as constant adaptation and adjustment. 
5.2 Social provisions 
In the subject area Social provisions, developments took off much later than for 
Free Movement of workers. Rather than displaying constant dynamics figure 3 
demonstrates two striking ‘high times’ – with peaks in 1992 and 2000 – and a 
much more restrained dynamic before and after. Specific subfields drive these 
dynamics: Health and safety at work the first peak and Labour law the second 
peak. The subfield Anti-Discrimination played a smaller role throughout. 
Health and safety at work acts protect workers against exposure to hazard-
ous situations and substances. They harmonize rules for protective equipment 
and safety of machinery, such as national laws on safety signs at the workplace 
(77/576 EEC) or occupational exposure limits to vinyl chloride monomers 
(77/576 EEC). The adoption of a “Framework directive on Safety and Health at 
Work” (89/391/EEC) was followed by daughter directives on specific hazards 
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(chemical agents 98/24/EC, biological agents 2000/54/EC, electromagnetic 
fields 2004/40/EC or asbestos 83/477/EEC).7 Labor law acts resemble issues in 
national legislation such as working time (93/104/EC) or industrial relations 
with directives on European Works Councils (94/45/EC), collective redundan-
cies (98/59/EC) or information and consultation rules (2002/14/EC). In the 
1990s, the social partners negotiated independently on a number of these acts. 
Later the Council adopted the agreements on parental leave (96/34/EC), part-
time work (97/81/EC) and fixed-term contracts (1999/70/EC) as directives with-
out changes in substance. In both subfields, the EU adopted few acts in the last 
10 years. This is surprising given the historical importance of general Labour 
law and Health and safety at work for the EU social dimension. 
More stable, in turn, are developments on Anti-discrimination. The Council 
adopted the first act that addressed equal pay for both sexes in 1975. Since, the 
EU has produced various directives in the sub-field. Today a number of discrim-
ination grounds (gender, race, belief, disability, age and sexual orientation) 
with a wide scope are covered. Equal treatment is no longer limited to employ-
ment, but extends to social protection, including healthcare and social ad-
vantages, as well as goods and services available to the public and offered out-
side the area of private and family life (Hartlapp 2017). Over time, the sub-field 
has developed into a fully-fledged policy for more equal societies. 
Finally, Social insurance acts address occupational pensions (2003/41/EC) 
and other measures targeted at older workers and their transition into old age 
security (e.g. decision No 940/2011/EU). Although competences firmly remain at 
the national level, the EU level regulation pursues social goals. Sometimes this 
is achieved through the backdoor of financial market instruments where trans-
parency and protection of beneficiaries support genuine social goals (Haverland 








7 In addition to the goal to protect workers the development benefitted from industry support-
ing the free movement of machinery and protective equipment through harmonization 
(Scharpf 2002). 
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Figure 3: Development of regulatory acts on Social provisions (1958–2017) 
Source: Own compilation based on EurLex, including modifications but excluding geographical 
extension, acts addressing one member state only and acts exclusively based on the Euratom 
treaty 
Overall, instruments in the area Social provisions mostly seek social goals in 
their own right. Instruments are directives rather than regulations and there is a 
substantial variation in dynamic over time. Particularly dynamic periods in the 
1990s and early 2000s contrast with a late take-off and recent inertia. It seems 
that here, social policy in its own right flourished at times when adoption was 
eased in terms of decision-making and fewer political contestations but ceased 
to do so after enlargement. This connection is discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 6. 
5.3 Funding 
Funding policies require rules about how to distribute and spend money (Levi-
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(ESF) as figure 4 demonstrates. The EU developed its rules on how to spend 
money and whom to support in the first decades of integration. ESF financing, 
approximately 14 billion annually, targets employment support and investment 
in human capital. Regulations address administrative and financial aspects, 
intervention rates or the creation of new types of aid for specific groups of work-
ers, e.g. young or self-employed (Regulation No 3824/85). 
More recently, Other spending measures have diversified the instruments in 
this domain, such as the “Globalisation Adjustment Fund” (Regulation No 
1927/2006) or the “Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived” (Regulation No 
223/2014). Creative usage of existing competences and household rules charac-
terizes these funds (Hartlapp et al. 2014: chapter 5.2.5). Unlike the ESF acts, they 
address individual citizens and thus aim at increasing the visibility of the EU as 
a political entity with a social dimension for its citizens. Finally, the literature 
does not recognize the usage of EU agricultural goods (CAP) for Direct distribu-
tion as instruments of EU social policy. Yet, for our purposes, it is meaningful 
for its clear interventionist character and the idea of solidary support to those 
most in need. At the core of this policy is a regulation on the “supply of food 
from intervention stocks to designated organizations for distribution to the most 
deprived persons in the Community” (No 3744/87), which was adopted in 1987 
and built on the milk-lakes and butter-mountains of the Common Agriculture 
Policy. Numerous modifications followed since and new acts are in the making 
(e.g. “milk for migrants” scheme). 
In sum, the regulation of distributive social policies has been an important 
element of EU social policy from its inception. While the late 1990s and early 
2000s were characterized by regulatory draught, we see a new dynamic since. 
Certainly limited in quantity, this positive dynamic contrasts with the decline in 
instruments classified as social policy in its own right in the other areas dis-
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Figure 4: Development of regulatory acts on Funding (1958–2017) 
Source: Own compilation based on EurLex, including modifications but excluding geographical 
extension, acts addressing one member state only and acts exclusively based on the Euratom 
treaty 
5.4 Discussion 
When we look across the three subject areas and subfields, three insights 
emerge. First, there are stark differences in terms of the type of instruments 
used. Typically, regulations are chosen to regulate Free movement of workers. 
Directives are much more typical for Social provisions. Second, timing and regu-
latory dynamics differ. Social standards related to freedom of movement have 
been adopted earlier and more steadily, while Social provisions or Funding show 
late take-off and an alteration between more and less dynamic periods. Third, 
the Free movement of workers is dominated by modifications rather than sub-
stantially new instruments that are relatively more relevant for Social provisions. 
What is important is that the lines along which these differences show coincide 
with our two logics. EU social policy supporting the market differs from EU so-
cial policy in its own right in type of instruments implemented, its timing and 
dynamic as well as its innovativeness, and – as I will argue in the next section – 
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6 Two types of social policy: exploring political 
drivers 
EU social acts supporting the market are more likely modifications than sub-
stantially new provisions. Their relatively continuous adoption seems to be 
largely unaffected by institutional and political developments. In particular, 
enlargements resulting in a higher number of Member States and a more heter-
ogeneous Council with respect to national social policy models do not seem to 
render decision taking more difficult for this group of acts. Rather, develop-
ments seem to be perceived as functional necessity to establish or increase mar-
ket efficiency independent of political majorities. On this basis, we may expect 
that EU social policy supporting the market is likely to continue developing. 
This contrasts with patterns in the groups of acts classified as EU social pol-
icy in its own right. Independent of the instrument type (dominant directives for 
Social provisions and regulations for Funding) acts are more often addressing 
substantially new provisions than being modifications. Dynamics nicely re-
spond to competence transfers. If we take into account a time lag of approxi-
mately two years for preparation and adoption of an act, the peaks emerge after 
the decision rules ease adoption of new acts at the EU level. This is most visible 
where high times following the Single European Act (1986) introduced new 
“rules on the working environment” and after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
transferred social policy competences for “information and consultation of 
workers” and “equality between men and women with regard to labor market 
opportunities and treatment at work”. The Nice Treaty (2001) further extended 
qualified majority voting, too. Yet, despite these growing competences, regula-
tory activity has clearly been less dynamic. We can link this observation to a 
general understanding of institutional rules enabling or constraining actors. 
Yet, they do not fully determine action; interests are important influences, as 
well. 
The data indicates that partisan politics might be a key determinant for so-
cial policy interests. The link has been theorized in comparative welfare state 
analysis where the strength of left (or Christian-democratic) parties holds strong 
explanatory power for the expansion of social policy (Schmidt 1996). Following-
up on the distinction between a rather functional group of market-supporting 
social policies and a more politically contested group of EU social policy 
measures in their own right, we should expect that ideology plays out different-
ly across these groups. Majorities of actors with a left orientation at the EU level 
should be particularly supportive of the adoption of social policy measures in 
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their own right. Against the high numbers of liberal and conservative Commis-
sioners in the Barroso Commissions (72,5% under Barroso I and 70,2% under 
Barroso II) it might thus be less surprising that fewer EU social policy directives 
have been proposed by the Commission recently (Graziano/Hartlapp 2018). To 
look at this more systematically, the partisan composition of Council and Euro-
pean Parliament would need consideration, too (Manow et al. 2007). Pursuing 
this line of reasoning has important implications for the question raised in the 
introduction. Where the current challenge to EU social policy depends on actors 
and their interests rather than on institutions and structures only, EU social 
policy can in principle be revived by changing political majorities. 
7 More market-supporting than social policy in 
its own right: what follows? 
Despite the fact that EU integration is largely driven by economic concerns, 
today the EU carries a substantial social dimension. The nature of this EU social 
policy is source of hopes as well as skepticism. This paper presented an original 
dataset of social policy output. It described patterns and dynamics across 346 
regulatory acts adopted since the start of EU integration. The main finding is 
that over time the shape of regulatory social policy has substantially changed. It 
continues to be quite dynamic in areas connected to the market freedoms and 
dominated by regulations, strengthening its market-supporting dimension. 
Social policy in its own right that resembles more closely to social policy as we 
know it from the national level – e.g. General labour law– is in massive decline. 
Thus, regarding timing, part of regulatory social policy was already ‘dead’ be-
fore the crisis and the other part is growing rather than declining. And whether 
EU social policy meets demands or not might thus (at least in parts) depend on 
the empirical focus of analysis. 
For this analysis the focus on regulatory social policy can be justified with 
the comparatively negligible volume of distributive policy (Schmid 2018: 177) 
and the attestation of a bias to follow economic rather than social goals in the 
OMCs (e.g. Copeland/Daly 2018). Nevertheless, future research would benefit 
from a more systematic comparison to empirically assess how typical the dou-
ble-track patterns and dynamic are across EU social policy instruments, e.g. 
spending and coordinating instruments. This would also allow to explore across 
EU social policy instruments whether overlap between market-supporting social 
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policy and social policy in its own right might be a characteristic of EU social 
policy. 
Concerning the scope of the findings, existing research indicates that EU 
social policy seems to differ from cross-sectoral patterns, where declining dy-
namics concerning regulations came into effect later (Kassim et al. 2017; Häge 
2011). This might be relevant for analysis of EU policy-making more widely, as 
we found that the differences in dynamics point at differences in the policy-
making processes. The influence of institutional and political factors such as 
competence transfer, decision-rules and interests seems to differ across the 
subfields. Constant adaptations and adjustment to new market conditions are 
likely to drive regulation supporting the market. And where no far-reaching new 
standards are negotiated, diverging interests and institutions (e.g. as more 
clearly visible after enlargement) seem to have little effect on social policy-
making. In contrast, where substantially new social standards in their own right 
are formulated, classical political factors such as heterogeneity of interests and 
ideology seem to be more important in explaining patterns. Thus, the present 
study confirms the need for research that looks at the role of interests and poli-
tics in addition to the explanations advanced in cross-sectoral studies of legisla-
tive activity, namely a better regulation agenda (Radaelli/Meuwese 2009) or 
crisis responses (Kassim et al. 2017). 
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Abstract: Auch wenn die Europäische Integration in erster Linie ein Prozess der 
Markt- und Wirtschaftsintegration ist, so hat die EU heute doch eine substantiel-
le soziale Dimension. Dabei ist jedoch umstritten, ob diese soziale Dimension 
primär der Unterstützung der Marktintegration dient oder ob wir von einer ei-
genständigen EU-Sozialpolitik sprechen können. Letzteres wäre dann der Fall, 
wenn die soziale Dimension der EU Ziele wie soziale Gerechtigkeit, Solidarität 
und bessere Arbeitsbedingungen auch dann verfolgt, wenn diese nicht der Stei-
gerung von Markteffizienz dienen oder wenn sie diesem Ziel sogar entgegenwir-
ken. Der vorliegende Beitrag präsentiert einen neuen Datensatz mit allen 346 
verbindlichen sozialpolitischen EU-Rechtsakten, die seit den Gründungsverträ-
gen angenommen wurden. In einer deskriptiven Analyse werden Instrumente 
und Entwicklungsdynamiken in Teilbereichen, die eher einer marktunterstüt-
zenden Logik folgen, mit Teilbereichen kontrastiert, die genuin soziale Ziele 
verfolgen. Auf dieser Basis lässt sich aufzeigen, dass die Gestalt der EU-
Sozialpolitik sich über die Zeit wesentlich gewandelt hat. Die marktunterstüt-
zende soziale Dimension wird kontinuierlich stärker, während die Entwick-
lungsdynamik bei Instrumenten mit genuin sozialen Zielen nachgelassen hat. 
Der Ausblick diskutiert politische Veränderungen als mögliche Erklärungsfakto-
ren dieser Entwicklungen. 
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